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NOTES AND COMMENTS

so dangerous in relation to the particular circumstances as to be
ultrahazardous in nature, the plaintiff may also seek to hold the
defendant-employer absolutely liable regardless of fault.3
It can be safely concluded that in North Carolina a plaintiff will
recover from the employer of an independent contractor who is
under any of the nondelegable duties enumerated in the preceding
discussion. However, the determination of this question does not
necessarily determine .the issue of who-the employer or the independent contractor-will ultimately bear the financial burden of
the plaintiff's judgment.
C. RALPH KINSEY, JR.
Torts-Successive Automobile Collisions-Joint and
Several Liability
That joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable for the
injuries caused by their negligence and can be joined in the same
action by the injured party is a basic principle of law accepted by
most jurisdictions.2 Generally, joint tort-feasors are persons who
fendant on that theory, and upon the principle of agency or respondeat
superior, a relation which as the evidence now stands did not exist.
Id. at 261, 17 S.E.2d at 130. The writer is not certain of the ramifications of
this language and recognizes that any attempted explanation is conjectural.
However, one possible explanation may be that the plaintiff failed to formulate the issue with respect to the negligence of the independent contractor.
This is based on the following language used by the court: "The contractor
may, of course, be liable for the same want of due care in not taking the
necessary precautions, for the omission of which the employer becomes
liable...." Id. at 259, 17 S.E.2d at 129.

"'There should be no problem. in joining this cause of action with that
for negligence under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953). The plaintiff may
be presented with the problem of election of remedies. However, these alternative theories do not appear to be inconsistent, and it is submitted that
the plaintiff should be allowed to have them submitted to the jury as alternative, provided, of course, the evidence in the case warrants it. See
Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleadings and Parties), 43 N.C.L. REv. 871, 877
(1965); Brandis, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive Joinder
of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1956);
Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1946); Civil Procedure, Eleventh Annual Survey of N.C.
Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv. 600, 612 (1964); Civil Procedure,Ninth,Annual
Survey of N.C. Case Law, 40 N.C.L. REV. 482, 491 (1962); Note, 13 N.C.L.
Ray. 226 (1935). In federal practice the plaintiff would be able to join
both claims for relief and would not be put to an election of remedies.
FED. R. Cxv. P. 8(e) (2).
'See, e.g., Harward v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.Supp. 170 (E.D.N.C.
1950); White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E. 564 (1921).
'See,

e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); Van
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act either intentionally, or negligently, in concert in committing a
wrong which results in injury to person or damage to property.3
Under this rule, when concert of action or purpose exists, 4 or the
breach of a common duty occurs,5 each tort-feasor is liable for all
injuries caused, on the theory that the act of one is the act of each.6
Neither the fact that the negligence of one may contribute more or
less to the injury than that of others, 7 nor the fact that one may be
8
more culpably negligent than the others makes any difference.
Furthermore, it does not matter whether there is one single injury
to the plaintiff," or whether each wrongdoer's action results in
separate injuries."0 A majority of courts have held that tort-feasors
who commit separate and independent acts of negligence with no
concert of action or purpose are not jointly and severally liable,'
but that each is liable only for the injuries proximately caused by
Troop v. Dew, 150 Ark. 560, 234 S.W. 992 (1921); Drake v. Keeling, 230
Iowa 1038, 299 N.W. 919 (1941); Tricoli v. Centalanza, 100 N.J.L. 231,
126 At. 214 (1924); Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958).
It should be pointed out that there is a great difference between the joinder
which holds the defendants to joint and several liability and that which is
merely procedural, allowing two separate causes of action to be tried at
the same time, for convenience. In this note, except where otherwise indictated, "joinder" will mean joint and several liability. See generally
PROSSR, ToRTs § 44 (3d ed. 1964).

Bost v. Metcalfe, 219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648 (1941). See 1 HARPER &
TORTS § 10.1, at 692 (1956).
' Concert of action and concert of purpose usually arise in conjunction
with each other. E.g., Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912)
(defendants engaged in racing their automobiles passed one on each side
of a wagon); Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961),
holding that in an automobile race, all participating parties may be held
liable even though the accident happened when the driver lost control
without coming in contact with any other vehicle.
E.g., Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. (9 Harr.) 559, 3 A.2d 118 (1938);
Johnson v. Chapman, 34 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744 (1897) (defendants who
had a duty to maintain a party wall held liable when it collapsed, destroying
plaintiff's warehouse).
'Sir
Case, 11 Co. Rep.
77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
,E.g., John
Hall Heydon's
v. Carroll, 253 N.C. 220, 1165, S.E.2d
459 (1960); Hale v.
City of Knoxville, 189 Tenn. 491, 226 S.W.2d 265 (1949).
E.g., Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N.C. 515, 11 S.E.2d 721 (1940); West
v. Collins Baking Co., 208 N.C. 526, 181 S.E. 551 (1935); Myers v.
Southern Pub. Utils. Co., 208 N.C. 293, 180 S.E. 694 (1935).
'E.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Brown v.
Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912); Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C.
725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961).
10 See, e.g., Miller v. Singer, 131 Colo. 112, 279 P.2d 846 (1955) ; Rouse
v. Jones, 254 N.C. 575, 119 S.E.2d 628 (1961); Charnock v. Taylor, 223
N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943).
" See, e.g., Stephens v. Schadler, 182 Ky. 833, 207 S.W. 704 (1919);
Bost v. Metcalf, 219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648 (1941). See PROSSER, TORTS
§ 44 n.47 (3d ed. 1964).
JAMES,
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his negligence."2 Recently, however, the trend has been toward a
general relaxation of the requirement of concert of action or purpose, and many jurisdictions, under certain circumstances, now
impose joint and several liability even though the tort-feasors did
not act in concert.3
The imposition of joint and several liability where separate
and independent acts of negligence cause automobile collisions will
be examined in this note. The most common situation arises where
the separate acts of two wrongdoers concur as to time and place
and unite to set into operation a single force which produces a
single impact, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. For example, the
automobiles of two defendants collide, and the plaintiff, a passenger
in one, is injured ;14 or two vehicles collide, and one goes out of
control, hitting a pedestrian.' Although in each case the collision
and injury resulted from independent acts of negligence, the courts
now hold that joint and several liability may be imposed.", The
negligent acts concurred at the same point in time and space to
produce a single impact and injury to the plaintiff, and each was thus
the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.'7
(1951);
12 See, e.g., Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P.2d 165
Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913);
Garret v. Garret, 228 N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948); Rice v. McAdams,
149 N.C. 29, 62 S.E. 774 (1908).
1" See Leasure, Joinder of Joint and Concurrent Tortfeasors, 23 OHIO
ST. L.J. 521 (1962); North Carolina Case Law--Torts, 41 N.C.L. Rv.
401, 514 (1963); 31 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS § 44 (3d ed.
1964).
'E.g., Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962); Rouse
254 N.C. 575, 119 S.E.2d 628 (1961).
v. Jones,
"5 E.g., Myers v. Southern Pub. Utils. Co., 208 N.C. 293, 180 S.E. 694
(1935).
The
18 See, e.g., Chesser v. Williams, 268 Ala. 57, 104 So. 2d 918 (1958).
North Carolina decisions are in accord. Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125
S.E.2d 754 (1962); Rouse v. Jones, 254 N.C. 575, 119 S.E.2d 628 (1961).
For other cases, see Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1425 (1929); Annot., 62 A.L.R.
1181 (1929); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 465 (1922).
" This is on the theory that there can be two or more actual and proximate causes of an injury, for absent the, negligence of either party, the
accident would not have happened. See, e.g., Salter v. Lovick, 257 N.C.
619, 127 S.E.2d 273 (1962); Darroch v. Johnson, 250 N.C. 307, 108 S.E.2d
589 (1959); White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E. 564
(1921). In Darroch v. Johnson, supra, the court said:
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. These may
originate from separate and distinct sources or agencies operating independently of each other, yet if they join and concur in producing the

result complained of, the author of each cause would be liable for the
damages inflicted, and action may be. brought against any one or all.
Darroch v. Johnson, supra at 313, 108 S.E.2d at 593.
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A more difficult situation is illustrated by successive collisions
where independent negligent acts cause multiple impacts upon
plaintiff, either of which may, or may not, cause injury. Three basic
situations arise in relation to such collisions, two of which do not
present a great problem for the courts.
The first arises where there are successive collisions, and the
plaintiff is injured in the second collision only. An illustration of
this situation is where A negligently hits B, the plaintiff, without
injuring him, and pushes him into the path of C, who negligently
hits and injures B.18 C would obviously be liable for all B's injuries
since his negligence directly caused those injuries. A can also be held
liable for all the injuries if it is found that his negligence was an
actual and proximate cause of the second collision, so that joint and
several liability exists."0
The second situation arises where there are separate collisions,
each of which has produced injuries that are both theoretically and
practically divisible.2 ° Such a case would exist where A runs over
B, the plaintiff, breaking his right arm; and an instant later, C also
runs over B, breaking his left arm.2 Assuming the first defendant's
negligence contributed in no causal way to the second accident, there
is no problem of joint and several liability.22 The plaintiff is able
to show the injury caused by each defendant, and each is liable only
for that caused by his own negligence.2
In the third situation, the main concern of this note, definite
"8See, e.g., Penton v. Fisher, 155 So. 35 (La. App. 1934) ; Batts v.
Faggart, 260 N.C. 641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963), where plaintiff's car was
struck from the rear by the vehicle negligently operated by the first defendant, and left standing crossways in the highway, subsequently being hit
by second defendant's car; Derleder v. Piper, 239 Wis. 269, 1 N.W.2d 146
(1941), where defendant's negligently operated car in which plaintiff was
riding collided with the car ahead, leaving defendant's car disabled on the
highway, where it was then struck by a following car. For other cases,
see Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 270 (1958).
1"

See generally, Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, North Carolina Case Law, 43

N.C.L. REv. 906, 926-31 (1965).
"0See, e.g., Smith v. Alabama Water Serv. Co., 225 Ala. 510, 143 So.
893 (1932); Resolute Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 132 So. 2d 244 (La. App.
1961) (damage done by the first collision could be identified and distinguished, first negligent driver not held liable for damage caused by the
second
collision); Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 Pac. 782 (1923).
21 See cases cited note 20 supra.
'

See note 19 supra.

See Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. 559, 3 A.2d 118 (1938); Cf., Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 49 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.C. 1943); 25
C.J.S. Damages § 25 n.67 (1941).
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problems arise. Here, successive or independent collisions arise
out of separate and independent acts of negligence, each producing
injuries which are theoretically, but not practically, attributable to
the negligent act of each wrongdoer.2" A good illustration of the
problem has arisen in the recent Wisconsin case of Caygill v. Ipsen 5
In August, 1961, the plaintiff, a guest passenger in an automobile,
was injured when the automobile was struck from the rear by a
vehicle driven by defendant Ipsen. In January of the same yearsome five months later-while the plaintiff was operating her own
automobile in a different county of the same state, it was struck
from the rear by a vehicle operated by defendant Thompson.
The plaintiff, in her action for personal injuries, attempted to
join both defendants in one action on the theory that each of the
collisions had caused injury to her cervical spine of such a nature
as to make allocation of the damage done by the negligent act of
each defendant impossible and that they should therefore be held
jointly and severally liable for her total injury. The court rejected
this contention, holding that the two collisions gave rise to separate
causes of action and that joint and several liability could not be
properly imposed. Thus, plaintiff's only remedy was a separate
action against each tort-feasor. Her problem is readily seen: Each
of the separate actions may, in turn, be defeated if she cannot
somehow produce evidence of the injury done by each collision.2
Plaintiff is caught up in a "vicious circle."
Successive collisions presenting this problem arise in a variety of
situations. The first defendant's automobile may strike the plaintiff, knocking him into the path of an oncoming second defendant
who also collides with plaintiff. 7 The first collision may leave
plaintiff stranded in his own lane to be struck by a second defendant's automobile following plaintiff.18 The plaintiff, after the first
collision, may recover control of his car and continue on his way,
2"E.g., Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C.
107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951) ; Neubert
v. Sichel, 333 Pa. 90, 3 A.2d 778 (1939).
2
Wis. -, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
Weisenmiller
v. Nestor, 153 Neb. 153, 43 N.W.2d 568 (1950).
2,See, e.g., Rundle v.
Grubb Motor Lines, Inc., 300 F.2d 333 (4th Cir.
1962); Horvath v. Tontini, 126 Conn. 462, 11 A.2d 846 (1940); Leinbach
v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 135 Kan. 40, 10 P.Zd 33 (1932).
" See, e.g., Borst v. Langsdale, 8 Ill. App. 2d 88, 130 N.E.2d 520 (1955);
Barney v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 179, 75 N.W.2d 683 (1956); Copple v. Warner,
260 N.C. 727, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963); Gatlin v. Parsons, 257 N.C. 469,
126 S.E.2d 51 (1962).
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only to be struck then by the second defendant.- In any case, it
often happens that the plaintiff is unable to allocate the injuries to
the individual acts of negligence. Generally, as in Caygill, courts
have refused to impose joint and several liability.30 Plaintiff may,
however, recover the whole amount of his injuries from the first
defendant. 31 If the requisite causal relationship is not present,
plaintiff is faced with proving the separate injuries inflicted by each,
or being defeated in a suit against either defendant.32 Thus, without the imposition of joint and several liability, plaintiff faces the
real possibility of getting no recovery for his injuries.
Most jurisdictions which refuse to allow the plaintiff to hold
the wrongdoers jointly and severally liable reason that a tort-feasor
should be liable only for that injury actually and proximately
caused by his negligence and that the burden of proving the injury
caused by a defendant's negligence should remain with the plaintiff.3 The difficulty or impossibility of allocating the injuries
makes no difference.3 4 These courts view the situation from the
standpoint of the negligent acts themselves, holding that each col':E.g., Batts v. Faggart, 260 N.C. 641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963).
' See, e.g., Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. 559, 3 A.2d 118 (1938); Close
v. Matson, 102 Ga. App. 663, 117 S.E.2d 251 (1960).
"' See note 19 supra. He may also recover from the second defendant for
any increased injuries done by the second collision. But, again, this requires
him to separate the injuries done by each collision. See generally, Graver v.
Rundle, 255 N.C. 744, 122 S.E.2d 720 (1961); Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C.
688, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956); Waller v. Skeleton, 31 Tenn. App. 103, 212
S.W.2d 690 (1948).
Cf., Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265
(1920), holding that if plaintiff cannot separate the damages, he does not
sustain his burden of proof and cannot recover against either tort-feasor.
"' These courts refuse to put upon the negligent party the possible burden
of having to pay more than his share of the injury done. See, e.g., Weisenmiller v. Nestor, 153 Neb. 153, 43 N.W.2d 568 (1950); La Bella v. Brown,
103 N.J.L. 491, 133 Atl. 82 (1926); Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220
Pac. 782 (1923). The court in Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. 559, 3 A.2d
118 (1938) said:
When ... a person seeks to recover from several tortfeasors compensa-

tion for separate injuries, resulting from distinct and disconnected
wrongful acts, some of which are committed by one wrongdoer, and
others by entirely different persons, a single action will not lie against
all of such wrongdoers ....

If the results as well as the acts are separable,

in theory at least, so that it can be said that the act of each would have
resulted in some injury, however difficult it may be as a practical matter
to establish the exact proportions of injury caused thereby, each can be
held liable only for so much of the injury as was caused by his act.
Leishman v. Brady, supra at 566, 3 A.2d at 120-21.
"E.g., Caygill v. Ipsen, - Wis. -, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965). See also
note 32 supra.
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lision-and the specific injury resulting therefrom-constitutes a
separate cause of action.35 As one court said: "It is the wrongful
act, and not the injury, that creates liability.""0 Many authorities
have criticized this approach37 on the ground that the significant
factor should be the injuries to the innocent party and his plight in
being unable to allocate these injuries. They contend that the
whole injury done is the cause of action.3" As Dean Wigmore has
pointed out, there is a manifest unfairness in:
Putting on the injured party the impossible burden of proving
the specific shares of harm done by each .... Such results are
simply the law's callous dullness to innocent sufferers. One would
think that the obvious meanness of letting wrongdoers go scot
free in such cases would cause the courts to think twice and to
suspect some fallacy in their rule of law. ... The rule should be:
Wherever two or more persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not, cause a single general harm, not obviously assignable in parts to the respective wrongdoers, the injured party may
recover from each for the whole. In short, wherever there is
any doubt at all as to how much each caused, take the burden of
proof off the innocent sufferer; make any one of them pay him
for the whole, and then let them do their own figuring among
themselves as to what is the share of blame for each.89
As successive collisions have become more common, some jurisdictions-perhaps in response to reasoning such as that of Dean
Wigmore-have allowed independent tort-feasors causing such
collisions to be held jointly and severally liable." In the leading case
of Maddu% v. Donaldson,41 plaintiff's car was struck from the
front by the first defendant and thirty seconds later was struck
from the rear by the second defendant's vehicle. It was impossible
s See note 34 supra.
Caygill v. Ipsen, - Wis. - - 135 N.W.2d 284, 286 (1965).
37
Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 399
(1939); Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages, 17 ILL.
L. Rzv. 458 (1923); 27 CoLuM. L. REV. 754 (1927); 19 CALIF. L. REv.
630 (1931); 31 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1953).
,' See authorities cited note 37 supra.
*' Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damnages, 17 ILL. L.
REv. 458, 459 (1923).
"'E.g.,Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321 (1961) ; Maddux
v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961); Barber v. Wooten,
234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951); Hodgin v. North Carolina Pub. Serv.
Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102 S.E. 748 (1920). See also North Carolina Case
Law-Torts, 41 N.C.L. REv. 401, 514 (1963); 31 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1953).
of cases, see Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 16 (1965).
For a362
collection
Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961).
41
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to allocate plaintiff's injuries to either collision. In overturning
Michigan precedent4 2 and allowing joint and several liability, the
court said:
The challenging situation . . . [is] before us, involving two sub-

stantial impacts with multiple injuries, in respect of which a jury
would be well justified in concluding that the plaintiff's various
injuries may not be identified as to origin. As a matter of fact,
it may be utterly unrealistic to insist that the plaintiff is suffering from merely a series of wounds, separable either legally or
medically. Actually the plaintiff may suffer from a composite
injury, the ingredients of which are impossible to identify in
origin and impracticable to isolate in treatment.43
Continuing, the court questioned the policy of requiring separate
actions in such cases: "Is it better, that a plaintiff, injured through
no fault of his own, take nothing, rather than that a tort-feasor
pay no more than his theoretical share of the damages accruing out
of a confused situation which his wrong has helped to create?""4
By the same reasoning, some courts have imposed joint and several
liability for independent and unrelated torts in other areas. 5
The questions facing the parties involved in such a situation are:
How far do the courts now go in imposing joint and several liability,
and, is there any way to determine this as to future cases? The
Wisconsin court, in Caygill, pointed out that in most situations
where joint and several liability has been allowed, there has been
a substantial relation between the collisions in time and place- that the collisions have occurred in such close proximity as to be
considered "one event or occurrence in the eyes of the lay onlooker.")47 Indeed, the Wisconsin court itself declined to rule out joint
"E.g., Meier v. Holt, 347 Mich. 430, 80 N.W.2d 207 (1960), where the

court held that second tort-feasor who inflicts injuries on plaintiff who has

been previously injured by first tort-feasor, is liable only for the amount
of increased injuries.

"Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 431, 108 N.W.2d 33, 36 (1961)
"Id. at 435, 108 N.W.2d at 38.
"This can be seen in the cases involving pollution, diversion, obstruction,
or flooding of a stream by various independent persons. See McDaniel v.
Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913); Lineberger v. City of Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146 S.E. 79 (1929); Landers v. East Texas Salt Water
Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952). But see, Farley v.
Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920); Mitchell
Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390 (1924).
See also 31 N.C.L. Rnv. 237 (1953).
"Caygill v. Ipsen, - Wis. -, -, 135 N.W.2d 284, 289 (1965).
' Id. at -, 135 N.W.2d at 289.
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and several liability where the collisions occur in close relation as to
time and place,4" but did point out that it has consistently refused
to allow any type of joinder where the torts are completely separate
and unrelated, "though their results do concur to cause an individual injury to the plaintiff. ' 49 It views the Caygill situation, where
there is obviously no time relation between the collisions, as being
composed of separate causes of action.
Many of the courts which impose joint and several liability upon
tort-feasors have specifically stated that they require a close relation in time and space between the collisions.5 Those which have
not so stated have apparently considered the time and place relation
an important factor, for there seems to be no decision imposing
joint and several liability where it could not be said there was a
reasonable time relationship between the accidents."' Thus, the
relation of the collisions in time and place might offer some indication of whether, in a given situation, a court will allow joinder.
The Michigan court, in Maddux, however, seems to have gone
beyond most of the jurisdictions which recognize exceptions to the
old rule of joint and several liability for only joint tort-feasors.
It places its emphasis entirely upon the injury to the plaintiff and
purports to disregard completely the relation of time and place.
"The fact that one wrong takes place a few seconds after the other
is without legal significance. What is significant is that the injury
is indivisible .... The reason for the rule as to joint liability was the
52
indivisibility of the injuries, not the time of the various blows.
It must be remembered, however, that the court in Mladdux was
specifically considering chain-reaction type collisions, in which
the accidents occurred only "a few seconds" 5 3 apart. The language
48

Ibid.

19 Ibid.
80
E.g.,

Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321 (1961).
Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321 (1961) (from
one to three seconds); Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d
33 (1961) (thirty seconds); Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d
690 (1951) (simply saying one collision occurred immediately after the
other); Hodgin v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102
S.E. 748 (1920); Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 16 (1965). Some courts have
denied joint and several liability where the time lapse was appreciable.
Hughes v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 236 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
352 U.S. 989 (1956) (more than three full minutes between collisions);
Montgomery v. Polk Milk Co., 118 Ind. App. 433, 79 N.E.2d 108 (1948)
(an interval of from five to seven minutes between collisions).
52 Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 434, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1961).
58
Ibid.
51E.g.,
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here, then, may not be sufficient basis for saying the Michigan
court will disregard the time factor.
In the recent case of Watts v. Smith54 however, the Michigan
court has more directly centered upon the time element and has
raised some doubt whether it will require any time and place relationship between collisions. In this case, plaintiff was riding in
an automobile which was struck from the rear twice in the same
day-once while enroute to work, and again while returning home,
some eight hours later. Plaintiff felt pain in his neck after the first
collision, but remained on the job throughout the day. After the
second collision, he had more pain in his neck and back, yet he went
to work the next day. Two days later, it became evident that he
was substantially injured. The lower court refused joinder, but
the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, allowing plaintiff to bring
action against both defendants in the same suit. The court indicated that this was not joint and several liability, but merely procedural joinder.55 Plaintiff still had two separate causes of action
and would be required to show, in the single trial, the separate
injuries done by each negligent party.58
The court then indicates, however, that it might be inclined
to impose joint and several liability in this situation, if it happened
that plaintiff was unable to give sufficient evidence of the respective
injuries inflicted by each collision: "If deadlock should develop over
apportionment of damages, it would then be incumbent upon the
57
trial court to consider the language of Maddux v. Donaldson."
The language to which the court referred is, "The difficulties and
dangers [of the suit] are to be thrown upon those presumably in
the wrong, rather than upon him who was not in fault."58 Thus,
the Michigan court may be prepared to disregard completely the
time and place relation of the collisions. When there is a substantial
time and place difference between the collisions, as in Watts and
Caygill, the plaintiff will usually have some opportunity to ascertain
the amount of injury done by the first collision before the second
"'375 Mich. 220, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
" Prosser seems to favor the rule against joint and several liability, but
he strongly advocates allowing procedural joinder. Prosser, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. Rnv. 413, 435 (1937).
Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 220, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
,134 N.W.2d at 196.
'T Watts v. Smith, supra at Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 426, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1961),
quoting Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596, 603, 10 N.W. 32, 34 (1891).
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occurs. Whereas, when the collisions occur within a short time of
each other, it is reasonable to assume that the injuries will not be
ascertainable until after the second collision. 9 It would seem that
when the plaintiff does have an opportunity to determine the extent
of his injuries from one of the collisions, the courts should require
him to do so and allow only separate actions against the wrongdoers.
If for some reason the plaintiff fails to determine his injuries after
the first collision, the inference of Watts is that the Michigan court
still would impose joint and several liability upon the defendants.
Whether the individual courts specifically concern themselves
with the plight of the plaintiff, the time and place relation of the
collisions, or other criteria, it seems they are in reality making the
same fundamental determination-whether, as a policy matter, they
are going to impose joint and several liability, on the theory that it
would be unfair to make the plaintiff sustain the burden of allocating the injuries in a given case. Bound up in this must necessarily
be the consideration of how far they will go in imposing such
liability, which seems to be largely determined by whether the collisions are sufficiently related in terms of time and place to make the
burden of separation of damages more unfair to the plaintiff than
to the defendants. What that time and place relation must be is
the concern of the individual court, which should apply the above
considerations to the facts of each case separately. 0 Any attempt
at prediction of the outcome of a given situation would be useless,
This is well stated by the concurring opinion of Black, J.:
The time element in these cases is usually crucial to decisions the
trial judge must make when he prepares to instruct the jury. It is so
because, if there is a lapse of appreciable time between the consecutive
blows, that lapse usually provides some proof or inference from proof,
on strength of which the trier or triers of fact may and accordingly
should assess the plaintiff's damages in separate amounts, however
difficult it may be as a practical matter to establish the exact proportion.
On the other hand, if the time element is too short for such proof, or if
other factors combine to eliminate any such proof, the jury should be
instructed that the causally negligent actors are to be held liable as
joint tortfeasors.
Watts v. Smith, supra at -, 134 N.W.2d at 197.
" In Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 120, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965), the
concurring opinion of Black, J., pointed this out:
The received delineative proof in each case will determine best what
rule or rules of law the trier or triers of fact should apply to these
successive impact cases, and . . . the availability of proof (of what was
after the first impact, and ... after the second . . . and so on) will . .
provide .

.

. dependable legal guides.

Watts v. Smith, supra at -,

134 N.W.2d at 197.
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though it does seem safe to predict that the courts will not impose
joint and several liability where there is absolutely no relation between the collisions, as in Caygill and Watts. This, of course, is
with the possible exception of Michigan.
As for the negligent defendant, the recent trend in relaxing the
rules of joint and several liability has put him at a disadvantage. He
is now subjected to the possibility of being required to pay a greater
share of the damages than was actually caused by his own negligence. However, one of the parties must necessarily be at a disadvantage in having the burden of proof, and it seems quite fair to
put this upon the defendant rather than upon the innocent plaintiff.
In mitigation of the harshness of this rule, a few courts that impose
joint and several liability will permit either defendant to produce
evidence to show what degree of the damage was, or was not,
caused by his negligence and will allow any judgment against him
to be reduced accordingly.'
JoHN R.

JOLLY, JR.

o See, e.g., Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 453, 207 P.2d 876 (D.C.
Cal, 1949). Cf., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (in
effect shifting the burden of proof to the defendants). North Carolina in
the past has held negligent drivers causing successive collisions jointly and
severally liable without giving them an opportunity to prove that they were
not responsible for all the damage. E.g., Hodgin v. North Carolina Pub. Serv.
Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102 S.E. 748 (1920). But see, Fox v. Hollar, 257
N.C. 65, 125 S.E.2d 334 (1962), and its treatment in North Carolirna Case
Law-Torts, 41 N.C.L. REv. 401 (1963).

